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INTRODUCTION:
THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON LEGAL DECISIONS:
WHAT CAN SOCIAL SCIENCE TELL THE COURTS AND
LAWYERS?
Theresa M Beiner
This symposium issue is the result of one of the best things about
being a legal academic: informal discussions about ideas that occur
between faculty members in the halls, over lunches and coffee, or
simply shooting the breeze in a colleague's office. My colleagues, John
DiPippa and Erica Beecher-Monas, and I, through informal conversations of this kind, realized that we had something in common. We were
all interested in how science and social science could inform the courts
and, more generally, the practice of law. What, you might ask, would a
scientific evidence scholar (Beecher-Monas), a legal ethics scholar
(DiPippa), and an employment discrimination scholar (Beiner) have in
common in this regard? While each of us had a different area of interest,
we all concluded that social science had a great deal of potential to
inform the legal system and lawyers. Professor Beecher-Monas, the real
scientist of the bunch, was interested in how and if social scientific
evidence would meet the United States Supreme Court's recently
pronounced admissibility standards in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' and its progeny. 2 Professor DiPippa's interest was
in how psychology might help lawyers better deal with and interact with
their clients. My interest surrounded sexual harassment law, and the
lower courts' and Supreme Court's precedent that appeared to me
inconsistent with how sexual harassment really operates in the workplace. At a certain point, we all decided that we needed to have a formal
discussion about these issues with others outside of the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. With the
generous underwriting of the Ben J. Altheimer Foundation through the
gracious intervention of our Deans, Rodney K. Smith and Charles W.
Goldner, and the support of the UALR Law Review members (especially
Symposium Editor Patti Stanley), we had the makings of what we
thought would be a very interesting symposium discussing the impact
of science on legal decisions. We were correct in our prediction. The
result was a three- paneled, day-long symposium, revolving around each
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carnichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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of our areas of interest, that engaged faculty members from around the
country and members of our law school community regarding the
impact of science on legal decisions. The results of that discussion are
contained in this symposium issue of the UALR Law Review.
The first panel, looking at scientific validity and judicial admissibility determinations, resulted in two articles that are in this issue.
Professor Beecher-Monas and Professor Edgar Garcia-Rill, Professor of
Anatomy and Psychiatry at the University of Arkansas for Medical
Sciences, discuss the admissibility and physiology of post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).3 After a thorough description of the nature of
PTSD, they analyze whether PTSD evidence should be admissible under
the Supreme Court's scientific evidence decisions. Their conclusion is
an overwhelming yes-that this evidence should be admissible as a
valid medical diagnosis in the appropriate case to explain a defendant
or victim's behavior. They also suggest situations in which the evidence
might be useful in court, thereby providing courts and lawyers with
insight into how valuable scientific evidence might be used in the legal
system.
Professor Janet C. Hoeffel, Professor at Tulane Law School, argues
that other social science evidence-specifically Battered Woman's
Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome-are not deserving of the
judicial deference they are currently given in the courts under Daubert.4
Instead, these syndromes do not meet the Supreme Court's admissibility
standards. Professor Hoeffel is all the more suspicious of the admissibility of this evidence because syndrome evidence that would help the less
powerful-poor criminal defendants-is not given the same judicial
deference as these syndromes. Thus, she argues that what is good for
one group should be good for the other: either syndrome evidence
should be admissible for all persons in our criminal justice system or for
none. Both of these articles contribute significantly to understanding
how the courts treat psychological and sociological evidence and where
they are going wrong.
The result of the second panel, on using social science to understand lawyers' professional obligations, is a paper contained in this issue
by my colleague Professor John DiPippa.5 Professor DiPippa takes an
3. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility ofPost-TraumaticStress Disorder,24 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK L. REV. 9 (200 1).
4. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social
Science Evidence in CriminalCases, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 41 (2001).
5. John M.A. DiPippa, How ProspectTheory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U.
ARK. LIrrLE RocK L. REv. 81 (2001).
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entirely different approach to the use of social science in the legal
system. By looking at current models of decision-making theory as
provided by social scientists, he suggests that the lawyer-client decisionmaking process lawyers currently rely on may have some flaws.
Criticizing rational choice models of client and lawyer behavior,
Professor DiPippa suggests that instead of making rational decisions
about the course of their cases, clients instead use perceptual shortcuts
and "irrational" factors in making decisions. Termed by theorists as
"prospect theory," this model suggests that lawyers should take a
different approach to client decision making. Building on this theory,
Professor DiPippa suggests that the legal counseling that all lawyers do
should be less ideological and more pragmatic. His article provides
valuable information about decision making theory and how lawyers
could incorporate this theory into their everyday practice to more
effectively meet their clients' needs.
The final panel, discussing the implications of social science on
sexual harassment law, resulted in three papers contained in this issue.
First, Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, of Thomas Jefferson School of
Law, and I took issue with different aspects of the newly created defense
for supervisor sexual harassment coming out of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton6 and Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth. In these cases, the Supreme Court, while creating an affirmative
defense for employers in cases of supervisory harassment, not only
increased its reliance on employer prevention and training efforts,
making these part of the defense, but also increased the burden on
victims of harassment to report such behavior.
Professor Bisom-Rapp questions the Court's continued reliance on
employer training and prevention. As Professor Bisom-Rapp explains,
social science provides little to no support for the Court's underlying
assumption in crediting such "prevention" efforts: that they do in fact
lessen or eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace. Professor
Bisom-Rapp suggests that sociologist Lauren Edelman's legal
endogeneity theory provides an explanation for the Court's continued
valuing of employer prevention and training. Edelman's theory is that
the "content and meaning of law is determined [by the organizations it]

6. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
7. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
8. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK.
LITLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2001).

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

is designed to regulate." 9 Professor Bisom-Rapp explains how this
theory applies to the Court's decision to embrace employer training and
prevention efforts to satisfy the first element of the EllerthiFaragher
affirmative defense for supervisory sexual harassment.
My article picks up on Professor Bisom-Rapp's theme of skepticism with respect to the affirmative defense, and suggests that the
second element of the defense likewise does not reflect the reality of
sexual harassment in the workplace." Specifically, I suggest that the
courts' continued insistence that victims of sexual harassment report the
harassment early and in the manner specified by the employer is out of
synch with how victims of harassment behave. How do I know this?
Because study after study by social scientists shows that reporting
harassment is the least likely response a victim will make. Instead,
victims engage in coping strategies-i.e., ignore the behavior in the
hope it will go away or avoid the harasser. Thus, the courts, at the
insistence of the United States Supreme Court, have placed an unrealistic burden on the victims of harassment and one that they routinely do
not meet. Instead, I suggest, the standard should take into account the
manner in which victims of harassment actually behave.
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger, of the University of California
at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, critiques the articles written by
Professor Bisom-Rapp and myself, suggesting that the manner in which
the courts approach the Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense depends on
what account of sexual harassment the courts wish to credit: a normative, descriptive, or doctrinal account." She argues that the approach of
both Professor Bisom-Rapp and myself is an endorsement of a
"descriptive account," i.e., that the manner in which sexual harassment
law is interpreted should be based on the manner in which actual victims
and harassers behave. She questions whether this is the best solution to
the difficult issue of workplace harassment. Competing accounts are
provided by normative or doctrinal approaches. For example, the courts
might provide that a victim of harassment must respond in a certain way
(a doctrinal account) or that a victim of harassment should respond in
a certain way (a normative account). While acknowledging that the
9. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulations: Grievance
Proceduresas RationalMyth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406,407 (1999).
10. Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual Harassment

Cases, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L. REv. 117 (2001).
11. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment-Normative,
Descriptive,andDoctrinalInteractions:A Reply to ProfessorsBeinerand Bisom-Rapp, 24 U.
ARK. Lnm ROCK L. REv. 169 (2001).
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descriptive account the courts use does not mesh with current understandings of how victims respond to sexual harassment or of how
effective training and prevention programs are, Professor Krieger probes
how to think about the law of sexual harassment while giving some
credit to other functions of law aside from merely accounting for human
behavior as it is. For example, perhaps sexual harassment law should
incorporate a standard that makes victims be more assertive. By
questioning the reliance of Professor Bisom-Rapp and myself on the
descriptive account, Professor Krieger shows that law is more complex
than a simple recitation of human behavior. All three articles provide
insight into and examples of how social science might inform legal rules
and affect legal decision making.
In reading all the articles in this issue and attending the live
symposium, I was struck by the heartfelt desire of all participants to
improve the legal system and make it more just for parties in both
criminal and civil cases, as well as the clients lawyers serve. That
science can help lawyers, judges, and jurors in this endeavor is a theme
that permeates all the articles. Each paper contributes to legal thought
about the intersection of science and law. In the end, I believe that we
accomplished more than we set out to do with the symposium. While we
intended to have a meaningful dialogue among academics about the
impact of science on legal decisions, it is my belief that this issue
provides valuable information that will help both lawyers and judges
better understand the impact science could have on legal decisions.

